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JURISDICTION 
Appellants file this reply brief pursuant to rule 24(c) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellee's statement of the case and argument is inaccurate in the 
following respects: 
1. Appellee's refer to fraud on the part of Appellants. (Pages 
21, 23 and 24 of Appelle's brief.) In fact, the trial court specifically 
ruled there was no fraud. 
2. Appellee's refer to a marshaling of the evidence. The issue 
presented by Appellant is whether or not Appellee is bound by her own con-
tradictory statements. 
3. An inspection performed by a duly licensed Utah State Safety 
Inspector is presumed to be proper unless evidence is presented to the contrary. 
4. Appellee's brief incorrectly represents the testimony of David 
T. Gray, an original defendant in this case but who was called as a witness 
for Appellee and against whom Appellee did not take judgment. 
ARGUMENT 
1. On page 21 of her brief Appellee states: "Plaintiff suffered 
a loss by reason of Defendants' fraudulent failure to disclose the defective 
and unsafe nature of the vehicle." 
On page 23 of her brief Appellee states: . "The trial court declined 
to enter an award of damages, but instead held that the suit was in the 
nature of fraud and that the appropriate remedy was rescission." 
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On page 24 of her brief Appellee states: "Recission is an appropriate 
remedy for fraud under Utah law. 
In its ruling the trial court stated: 
Now, in terms of remedy, I think this is not in the 
nature of fraud (emphasis added) (Ruling of the 
Court Pg. 4, R 249) 
In its Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Amended 
Judgment the court makes no finding of fraud. 
It is inappropriate and misleading for the Appellee to discuss the 
issues in this case as though there had been a finding of fraud. 
2. In her testimony regarding representations made to her by Appellant, 
Appellee makes inconsistant statements. These are quoted in Appellants' 
brief on pages 7,8 and 9. 
In 30 Am. Jur. 2d at page 240 the general rule is stated as follows: 
It has frequently been stated in broad general terms 
that a party is bound or concluded by his own testimony 
which is favorable to the adverse party " 
In Brooks v. Stewart (Mo. 1960), 335 SW2d 104, 81 A.L.P.2d 516, the 
court stated: 
When we say that a plaintiff is entitled to a favorable 
view of the whole evidence we do not mean that material 
facts testified to by plaintiff may be ignored. A 
plaintiff is bound by his own testimony. 
In Tracy Loan & Trust Co. v. Openshaw Inv. Co. (Utah 1942), 132 P.2d 
388 at 392, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Ordinarily when a person contradicts his prior testimony 
because it appears to be to his advantage to do so, the 
veracity of such witness may become so questionable that 
it may require strong and convincing corroborative evidence 
to induce a court oi jury to believe his subsequent 
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declarations. If there is substantial competent 
evidence which is relevant and material, a finding of 
the court will not be disturbed, although the court 
might well have found otherwise. 
In this case only two persons are fully aware of the communications 
between them. Plaintiff - Appellee should be bound by her statements 
under oath which are favorable to defendant - Appellant. 
3. Defendant - Appellants1 brief cites the sworn testimony (Appellants 
brief pgs. 10, 11, tr. 122, 123, 166, 167, 174, 182, 183) of both witnesses 
for plaintiff and defendants that the subject automobile could not have 
passed a Utah State Safety Inspection in the condition in which it was 
found to be in May of 1989. 
In April of 1989 (a year after the purchase of the subject automobile) 
plaintiff had it inspected and it passed inspection. (Exh. D-13) 
No witness in any way contradicted the above-referred testimony or 
attempted to attack the validity of Exh D-13. 
An official act done pursuant to state authority is presumed to be 
proper and valid. Defendant was under no obligation to show the state 
inspection was properly performed. On the contrary, if there was a flaw 
in the inspection, it was up to the plaintiff to demonstrate this to the 
court. 
In 30 Am. Jur. 2d at page 233, the general law is stated as follows: 
It is often said that uncontradicted and unimpeached 
evidence must be taken as true in the sense that it 
cannot be arbitrarily disregarded or be disregarded 
as against a mere suspicion of untruth or falsity. 
With respect to presumptions, the Utah Supreme Court in Re Swan's 
Estate, 293 P.2d 682, at 688, stated: 
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Sane opinions in this court have held that the only 
effect of a presumption is to place on the disflavored 
party the burden of producing prima facie evidence to 
the contrary and thereupon the presumption is eliminated, 
and it is firmly established that such is the effect of 
many presumptions. However, we have also recognized 
that other presumptions are not so eliminated but have the 
effect of placing on the disfavored party the burden of 
pursuading the fact finder that the facts are contrary to 
the presumed facts; 
As stated above, plaintiff - Appellee had the subject vehicle inspected 
in April of 1989, a year after she purchased it. It passed inspections. 
All witnesses - both for plaintiff and defendant - testified that it could 
not have passed inspection in the condition it was found to be in in May 
of 1989. 
4. Plaintiff - Appellee refers to the testimony of David T. Gray 
to jpstaripe the argument that defendant - Appellants had a right to believe 
the subject automobile was in safe condition when it was sold to plaintiff. 
As previously stated, David T. Gray was originally named by plaintiff 
as a defendant in this matter. He subsequently became employed by Less 
Jenson Collision Repair (plaintiff's witness), became a witness for plaintiff, 
and plaintiff did not seek to tkae judgment against him. 
Prior to becoming a witness for plaintiff, David T. Gray sent an answer 
to plaintiff's complaint to plaintiff's attorney. In that complaint David 
T. Gray stated (in part): 
I think Less Jensonfs Collision Repair has put false accusa-
tions in plaintiff's head. I also understand that the original 
insurance bid on the vehicle had 3.0 labor hours on the 
frame? repair, therefore the safety factor of this vehicle is 
false, it had more cosmetic damage than structural damage. 
I also believe that the right apron panel should have been 
replaced and the right quarter panel, but on a vehicle with 
a conventional frame, it didn't place any negligent danger to 
plaintiff. 
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So in conclusion, I ask, why was the car aligned if the 
repair on the structure was negligent? (The car would not 
be able to be aligned), (emphasis added) (Exh. D-31) 
Plaintiff presented evidence that a principle reason the subject 
automobile was unsafe was because it was of "unibody" construction. (Tr. 
113-116, 118) 
In his examination concerning why he had declared the subject vehicle 
to be safe, David T. Gray testified: 
Q. by Mr. Martineau: When you wrote on this exhibit (Exh. 31): 
I believed that the right apron panel should have been placed in the 
right quarter panel, but on a vehicle with a conventional frame, it didn!t 
place any negligent danger on the plaintiff 
A. I think at that time particular time that I wrote that, I thought 
that car had a conventional frame under it, that it wasn't a unibody. 
(Tr. 132) 
Mr. David T. Gray was employed by defendants to repair the subject 
vehicle. (Tr. 125) He did the welding and repair thinking it had a con-
ventional frame. It had a unibody. After it was repaired he thought it 
was safe and didn't think differently until he discovered his mistake. 
Any negligence attributable to repairing the subject vehicle as a conventional 
construction rather than "unibody" is directly attributable to David T. Gray 
and not the Appellants. 
_ day of October, 1992. 
\^y\^4. 
AMES L. BARKER"" 
Attorney for Appellants 
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